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We propose a post-selection technique, based on quantum error detection, for quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) systems that run over quantum repeaters with encoding. In such repeaters, quantum
error correction techniques are used for entanglement distillation. By developing an analytical ap-
proach to study such quantum repeaters, we show that, in the context of QKD, it is often more
efficient to use the error detection, rather than the error correction, capability of the underlying code
to sift out cases where an error has been detected. We implement our technique for three-qubit rep-
etition codes by modelling different sources of error in crucial components of the system. We then
investigate in detail the impact of such imperfections on the secret key generation rate of the QKD
system, and how one can use the information obtained during entanglement swapping and decoding
stages to maximize the rate. For benchmarking purposes, we specify the maximum allowed error
rates in different components of the setup below which positive key rates can be obtained.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Bg
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum repeaters (QRs) are among the most com-
plex systems that need to be developed for true quantum
connectivity in the future [1, 2]. Their implementation
faces experimental challenges in developing long coher-
ent storage of quantum states and/or reliable processing
of them, as well as efficient interfaces and measurement
modules [3]. They would also give rise to theoretical
conundrums of understanding and modelling multipar-
tite entangled states in the presence of various imperfec-
tions. As a possible way forward, it would be interest-
ing to come up with useful setups—implementable with
today’s or near future technologies—that benefit from
concepts and techniques in QRs. Twin-field [4–6] and
memory-assisted [7–10] quantum key distribution (QKD)
are among such examples. In this work, we look at an in-
teresting class of quantum repeaters, which rely on quan-
tum error correction for their entanglement distillation
[11], and examine how best such systems can be used for
QKD applications. We develop reliable tools to obtain
and study the shared states between two users via such
a repeater chain. This enables us to quantify how dif-
ferent components of the shared state contribute to the
distillable secret key rate. This leads us to an interesting
observation that majority of the obtained secret key bits
correspond to the cases where no error has been detected
along the repeater chain and decoder modules. This
would then offer a simple, but effective, post-selection
technique that considerably improves the key rate and
increases the resilience of the system to errors as com-
pared to when error correction is applied, as originally
intended, with no post-selection.
Theoretically speaking, quantum repeaters have gone
through a number of development stages, sometime re-
ferred to as different QR generations [12]. QRs were ini-
tially proposed to enable entanglement distribution, in
an efficient way, at long distances [13]. Using telepor-
tation techniques [14, 15], one can then send quantum
information across a quantum network once entangled
states are shared between remote users. The main idea
behind such repeaters is to split the link into shorter el-
ementary segments and first distribute and store entan-
glement over such links. One can then use entanglement
swapping (ES) [16] and, possibly, entanglement distilla-
tion (ED) to establish high fidelity entanglement over
long distances. In early implementations of QRs, it is
expected that the initial entanglement distribution [17]
over elementary links, as well as ES and ED operations
to be probabilistic [18]. This can make the whole sys-
tem too slow as many steps may need to be repeated
upon a failure [19]. Such probabilistic QRs often require
quantum memories with long coherence times, compara-
ble to the transmission delay between the two end users
[20]. It would help, to some extent, if the ES opera-
tion is deterministic, but, so long as the ED steps are
probabilistic [21, 22], we still need to repeat part of the
protocol every time that ED fails. A remedy to this prob-
lem was proposed in [11], in which ED is effectively done
by using quantum error correction techniques. This op-
eration can, in principle, be done deterministically, and,
combined with deterministic ES operations, it can give
a boost to the entanglement generation rate in a QR.
This advantage, which corresponds to less waiting time,
hence lower required coherence times, may come at the
price of more demanding quantum processing require-
ments. By further improving our quantum error correc-
tion and quantum processing capabilities, one can design
QR systems that are resilient to loss and error, hence
can accomplish all the required tasks in a QR in a de-
terministic way [23–27]. In such QRs, we no longer need
to distribute entanglement. Instead, we can directly en-
code our message into a codeword and send it hop-by-hop
across the network. This will, however, be further away
in terms of an experimental demonstration.
In this work, in the spirit of having an eye on near-
future implementations, our focus will be on the tran-
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2sition from probabilistic QRs to deterministic QRs that
use quantum error correction techniques only for their
ED operations [11, 28, 29]. In such QRs, using a num-
ber of bipartite entangled states, we create a multi-qubit
entangled codeword across elementary links. As we ap-
ply the ES operations, this codeword structure will then
allow us to correct some of the errors that happen be-
cause of imperfections in the employed gates, measure-
ment modules, and/or the initially distributed bipartite
states.
In principle, one can choose different code structures to
implement such systems. Here, we choose the repetition
codes to study and develop our methodology. They offer
a simple structure, which can make their implementation
easier, and still have relevance in systems where one type
of error is more dominant than the other. For instance, if
the memory decoherence is affected mainly by a dephas-
ing process, the corresponding errors are modelled by the
Pauli operator Z [7], hence a code structure resilient to
this type of error could be useful. The repetition codes
would also offer a good learning platform, for theoretical
studies, to better understand how different components
of the system can affect the final result, and to come up
with relevant techniques for analysing more complicated
code structures.
In this work, we devise an analytical method to study
the above QR setups. We, however, realise that, even for
the seemingly simple case of repetition codes, the analysis
can become cumbersome quite quickly. Previous work on
this subject [11, 30] often rely on various approximations
to analyse the system. In this work, we try to remain as
close as we can to the exact results and only use approx-
imations that are analytically justified and numerically
verified. Our approach relies on the linearity of the quan-
tum circuits, and the transversality of the code employed
to manage the complexity of the analysis. This will en-
able us to obtain an accurate picture of the requirements
of such systems in practice.
Using our methodology, we study the performance of
QKD systems run over QRs with three-qubit repetition
codes by accounting for various sources of error in the
setup. We identify the terms that significantly impact
the secret key generation rate, and then assess its depen-
dence on relevant error parameters. In previous work on
this subject [30], the repeater chain is used to create a
bipartite entangled state, which the two users will then
employ to exchange a secret key. In our work, we allow
the users to exploit the information obtained during the
entanglement swapping and decoding stages to divide the
states that they obtain, and keys generated from them,
into different groups. This not only improves the key rate
and the resilience of the system to errors, but also allows
us to identify states that majorly contribute to the secret
key rate. It turns out that in most cases the key contri-
bution is from the golden states for which no error has
been detected at either swapping or decoding stage. This
will enable us to use an efficient post-selection technique
that not only simplifies the analysis of the system, but
also can reduce the complexity in any practical demon-
stration of the setup. We believe that our work can pave
the way for similarly detailed analysis of other repeater
protocols with more complex encoding. This will enable
quantitative rate-versus-resource analysis for various pro-
tocols.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we begin
with a description of the repeater protocol in Ref. [11] and
the error models we use to formulate the problem in hand.
In Sec. III, we discuss the linearization method employed
for our study and go over the exact analysis for nesting
level one. We fully study the effect of different terms,
components, and system imperfections before generaliz-
ing our results, in Sec. IV, to higher nesting levels. We
present the dependence of the secret key generation rate
for such QRs on different error parameters and find the
corresponding thresholds for extracting a nonzero secret
key rate at different nesting levels. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Sec. V.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first start with a detailed review of
the QR scheme with encoding proposed by Jiang et al.
[11] and the respective quantum circuits designed to im-
plement it. Then, we introduce the error models consid-
ered in our analysis, followed by the problem statement
and the key objectives of our study.
In this work, we mainly use the 3-qubit repetition code
as an example to illustrate and develop our key ideas and
techniques, where the logical qubits are encoded as
|0˜〉 = |000〉 and |1˜〉 = |111〉, (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 represent the standard basis for a sin-
gle qubit. This code can correct up to one bit-flip error.
Although it is not a strong error correction code, the
thorough analysis of its performance with possible errors
considered in its implementation will still offer us an in-
dication of how this type of QRs performs.
A. Quantum repeater with 3-qubit repetition code
Here, we describe the ideal setting of the protocol pro-
posed in [11] in the special case of 3-qubit repetition
codes. In this protocol, depicted schematically in Fig. 1,
we first generate encoded entangled states across all ele-
mentary links, and then apply ES operations at interme-
diate nodes to both distill and swap entanglement across
the chain.
The encoded entangled state of interest across an ex-
ample elementary link A-B in Fig. 1 is in the form
|Φ˜+〉A,B = 1√
2
(|0˜〉A|0˜〉B + |1˜〉A|1˜〉B), (2)
where |˜i〉K ≡ |i〉K1 |i〉K2 |i〉K3 , for i = 0, 1 and K = A,B.
In Fig. 1, the memory bank K = {K1,K2,K3} is shown
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FIG. 1: Schematic representation of quantum repeaters with
encoding. (a) The codeword states are locally prepared at
each memory bank (large blue ovals) and original Bell pairs
are distributed between neighboring nodes (small yellow ovals
connected by yellow lines); (b) Encoded Bell pairs are gen-
erated between neighbouring stations by performing remote
CNOT gates; (c) The encoded ES operations are performed
at each intermediate station simultaneously. This creates an
encoded Bell pair between the two end users. Based on the
measurement results at each middle node, the Pauli frame of
the final entangled state can be adjusted.
by large (blue) ovals. This multipartite entangled state
is distributed between memory banks A and B in the
following way:
Step 1 Initialize memory banks A and B in the code-
word states 1√
2
(|0˜〉A + |1˜〉A) and |0˜〉B , respectively. The
codeword state for node A can be achieved by applying
two controlled NOT (CNOT) gates, CNOTA1→A2 and
CNOTA1→A3 , on the state
1√
2
(|0〉A1 + |1〉A1)|0〉A2 |0〉A3 ,
where, in the notation CNOTK→J , K is the control qubit
and J is the target qubit. We use the same notation
for pairwise CNOT gates between qubits in two mem-
ory banks K and J . This ideally leads to the desired
codeword state
1√
2
(|000〉A + |111〉A) = 1√
2
(|0˜〉A + |1˜〉A). (3)
The above state can, in principle, be obtained proba-
bilistically as well, by repeating a preparation procedure
until success. Given that the preparation is a local pro-
cess, it can possibly be repeated at a sufficiently fast rate
to ensure success in a reasonable time.
Step 2 In order to generate |Φ˜+〉A,B , we share 3 bipar-
tite maximally entangled states between the correspond-
ing memories in memory banks a and b, shown by small
yellow ovals in Fig. 1(a), co-located, respectively, with
memory banks A and B. These Bell states, shown by yel-
low lines in Fig. 1(a), can be distributed in advance, or in
parallel with step 1. The implementation of this process
and the quality of the generated entangled states depend
on the specifics of the employed experimental platform.
FIG. 2: Circuit for remote CNOT gate [31] between a qubit
c at node Ai, as control qubit, and a quibt t at node Bi, as
the target qubit. Using the maximally entangled state shared
between ai and bi nodes, and by applying two local CNOT
gates on Ai-ai and bi-Bi pairs, we can effectively implement a
remote CNOT gate on Ai-Bi. Note that this requires single-
qubit measurements on ai and bi, classical communication,
and local single-qubit rotation on Ai and Bi.
Normally, this step is mediated with photons, hence is
often probabilistic and needs to be heralding.
Step 3 We use the distributed bipartite entangled
states to implement three remote CNOT gates, see Fig. 2
and its caption for further detail, which are applied
transversally, leading to the desired state for the elemen-
tary link:
1√
2
(|0˜〉A + |1˜〉A)⊗ |0˜〉B CNOTA→B−→ |Φ˜+〉A,B . (4)
Once the encoded entangled states are distributed
across all elementary links, the next step is to perform ES
operations at all intermediate stations to extend the en-
tanglement to the entire link. For instance, in Fig. 1(b),
in order to establish multipartite entanglement between
memory banks A and D, we perform an encoded Bell
measurement on memory banks B and C. This, due to
the transversality of the employed code, is simply done
by performing three individual Bell-state measurements
(BSMs) on the corresponding pairs of physical qubits
in B and C. More specifically, such BSMs can be re-
alized deterministically by applying CNOTBi→Ci , fol-
lowed by a projective X-measurement on qubit Bi and
Z-measurement on qubit Ci, for i = 1, 2, 3. In the ideal
case, right before the single-qubit measurements, the ini-
tial state of the two links would then undergo the follow-
4ing transformation [11]
|Φ˜+〉A,B ⊗ |Φ˜+〉C,D
=
1
2
(|Φ˜+〉A,D ⊗ |Φ˜+〉B,C + |Φ˜−〉A,D ⊗ |Φ˜−〉B,C
+ |Ψ˜+〉A,D ⊗ |Ψ˜+〉B,C + |Ψ˜−〉A,D ⊗ |Ψ˜−〉B,C)
CNOTB→C−→ 1
2
(|Φ˜+〉A,D ⊗ |+˜〉B |0˜〉C + |Φ˜−〉A,D ⊗ |−˜〉B |0˜〉C
+ |Ψ˜+〉A,D ⊗ |+˜〉B |1˜〉C + |Ψ˜−〉A,D ⊗ |−˜〉B |1˜〉C),
(5)
where |Φ˜±〉A,D = 1√2 (|0˜〉A|0˜〉D ± |1˜〉A|1˜〉D), |Ψ˜±〉A,D =
1√
2
(|0˜〉A|1˜〉D ± |1˜〉A|0˜〉D) and
|±˜〉B = 1√
2
(|0˜〉B ± |1˜〉B)
=
1
2
(| ± ±±〉B + | ± ∓∓〉B
+ | ∓ ±∓〉B + | ∓ ∓±〉B), (6)
with |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2 for a single qubit.
By measuring the states of Bi and Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, in,
respectively, X and Z basis, we project the state of A and
D in Eq. (5) into one of the encoded Bell states. This
becomes possible because all terms in |+˜〉 (|−˜〉) have an
odd (even) number of |+〉 states, and measuring |0˜〉 (|1˜〉)
ideally results in three |0〉 (|1〉) states. In the non-ideal
case, it is possible that, instead of three identical out-
puts, we get, for instance, two |0〉s and one |1〉. But,
then, because of the employed error correction scheme,
we can still identify which Bell state is the most likely
outcome of the ES process. Note that, by accounting for
the erroneous cases, there will be 64 different combina-
tions of measurement outcomes, and each of them will
uniquely lead to one type of encoded Bell pair. Even
though the measurement outcomes at each middle sta-
tion should be announced to Alice and Bob to determine
the Pauli frame for the encoded Bell pair shared by them
in the end, this scheme would not rely on any commu-
nication among middle stations, which reduces the time
scaling from polynomial to polylogrithmic [12]. For ap-
plications, such as QKD, that can deal with Pauli frame
adjustments at the post-measurement stage, this scheme
also lowers the waiting time, and correspondingly the re-
quired coherence time for the memories.
After all ES operations, an encoded entanglement is
ideally distributed between the two end users. In order to
do QKD, or other possible applications, the final encoded
entangled states can be decoded into a bipartite state.
The decoding circuit employed in this work is simply the
reverse process of the encoding procedure for three-qubit
repetition codes [30], as depicted in Fig. 3. Alice and
Bob each apply this circuit to their three qubits in hand,
and measure two of them. They flip the first qubit only
if they measure |1〉 in the other two qubits.
The above repeater protocol implements an implicit
entanglement distillation by using error correction tech-
FIG. 3: Quantum circuit for decoding 3-qubit repetition
codes [30]. Alice and Bob will both use the same circuit for
decoding, in which they flip their first qubit if they measure
|1〉 in all other qubits.
niques. This is partly done at the ES stage and is sup-
plemented by the final error correction that happens at
the decoding stage. But, for protocols such as QKD,
which can cope with discarding data if needed, the other
possibility is to use the information available at the ES
stations to discount the end-to-end distributed state if
an error has been detected at any intermediate stage.
By doing so, we only keep the cases for which we are
more confident that we have got the desired Bell state,
and, effectively, distill the entanglement generated by the
repeater chain. So long as the chance of error is low, this
still offers a nearly deterministic solution for quantum
repeaters.
In this work, we will examine how the above idea
can improve the performance of QKD systems that run
over such repeaters. It turns out that the secret key
rate of such QKD systems is dominated by the post-
measurement state corresponding to when no error has
been detected at ES and decoding stages. Nevertheless,
we still need to calculate the effect of errors on system
performance. Detecting no errors by our error correction
scheme does not guarantee the absence of errors. The de-
coded state is still affected by errors not detectable by our
error correction scheme, some of which would correspond
to higher order error terms that may not be properly ac-
counted for if our analysis is not sufficiently accurate. In
the following, we first summarise the error models used
in our analysis. We then describe the problem in the
context of previous research on this subject.
B. Error models
Three major imperfections are considered in our anal-
ysis:
(1) Imperfections in initial Bell states: The origi-
nally distributed Bell states, i.e., yellow links in Fig. 1(a),
are not necessarily perfect. We model them as Werner
states with fidelity F0:
ρW = F0|φ+〉〈φ+|+ 1− F0
3
(I4 − |φ+〉〈φ+|), (7)
5where |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) and I4 is a 4 × 4 identity
matrix.
(2) Gate imperfections: We employ the generic
model for imperfect two-qubit operations introduced in
Ref. [13]. The unitary operation Ui,j , acting on qubits i
and j, is modelled by
ρout = (1− β)Ui,jρinU†i,j +
β
4
Tri,j(ρ
in)⊗ Ii,j , (8)
where ρin (ρout) is the input (output) before (after) the
two-qubit gate Ui,j , β is the gate error probability and
Ii,j is the identity matrix for qubits i, j. The main two-
qubit gate used in this paper is CNOTi→j .
(3) Measurement imperfections: The projective
measurements to states |0〉 and |1〉 are, respectively, rep-
resented by
P0 = (1− δ)|0〉〈0|+ δ|1〉〈1| and
P1 = (1− δ)|1〉〈1|+ δ|0〉〈0|, (9)
where δ is the measurement error probability. Similar
measurement operators, P±, are used for projective mea-
surement in |±〉 basis.
In our analysis, we neglect other types of errors that
may be present in a real setup. For instance, we as-
sume all single-qubit unitary operations, i.e., bit-flip (X
gate) or phase-flip (Z gate) rotations, are perfect. In the
case of QKD as an application, this is justified as these
operations can typically be implemented in the classical
post-processing stage. In order to simplify the analysis,
we also assume that quantum memories with sufficiently
long coherence times are available. Considering that the
waiting time for encoded QRs is comparatively low, we
neglect the memory decoherence effects in our analysis.
C. Problem Description
In this work, we study the performance of a QKD sys-
tem that is run over an encoded QR setup with three-
qubit repetition codes by accounting for errors in the
setup as presented above. We consider an entanglement-
based QKD setup that relies on BBM92 protocol [32].
We use an asymmetric implementation of the protocol
where the two end users, Alice and Bob, choose the two
measurement bases, i.e., Z and X bases, unevenly, in or-
der to increase the basis-sift factor [33]. Our objective is
to assess the dependence of the secret key generation rate
in our QKD system on relevant error parameters. To this
end, we first need to calculate the secret key generation
rate per decoded state, ρdec, shared between Alice and
Bob. In the asymptotic regime, this parameter, known
as secret fraction [30], is given by [34]
r∞(ρdec) = max{0, 1− h(ez)− h(ex)}, (10)
where h(p) = −plog2p− (1− p)log2(1− p) is the binary
Shannon entropy, and
ez = Tr(P
Alice
0 P
Bob
1 ρ
dec) + Tr(PAlice1 P
Bob
0 ρ
dec)
= (δ2 + (1− δ)2)(〈ψ+|ρdec|ψ+〉+ 〈ψ−|ρdec|ψ−〉)
+ 2δ(1− δ)(〈φ+|ρdec|φ+〉+ 〈φ−|ρdec|φ−〉)
ex = Tr(P
Alice
+ P
Bob
− ρ
dec) + Tr(PAlice− P
Bob
+ ρ
dec)
= (δ2 + (1− δ)2)(〈φ−|ρdec|φ−〉+ 〈ψ−|ρdec|ψ−〉)
+ 2δ(1− δ)(〈φ+|ρdec|φ+〉+ 〈ψ+|ρdec|ψ+〉) (11)
are, respectively, the observed error rates in Z and X
bases, where |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉±|11〉) and |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉±
|10〉), in the joint state space of Alice and Bob, and mea-
surement operators are defined according to Eq. (9) with
additional superscripts to specify the affected qubit.
In order to understand the effect of various system pa-
rameters on the final secret key rate, we simulate the
above setting in the nominal mode of operation where no
eavesdropper is present. In this case, ρdec will then be
given by the shared state between Alice and Bob after
decoding, from which we can calculate the error parame-
ters ez and ex in the asymptotic regime, where an infinite
number of entangled states are shared among users. Our
problem would then reduce to specifying what ρdec is in
a typical error-prone QR setting with encoding.
While at first glance this may look like a quite straight-
forward problem, in practice, we face some computa-
tional challenges. The obvious way to calculate the final
entangled state is to obtain the encoded entangled state
at each elementary link and then apply ES in a nested
way. For a 3-qubit repetition code, the ES operation in-
volves 12 qubits, so our operation is on a space with di-
mension 212. This may sound manageable, but certainly
not scalable. The next simplest code, i.e., 5-qubit repeti-
tion code, requires operation on 20 qubits, or a space of
dimension 220. It is easy to see how problem can get out
of hand quite quickly. Proper analytical and numerical
techniques are then needed to handle this problem.
Previous work on this subject [11, 30] often rely on var-
ious approximations to solve the problem. The original
work in [11] makes some assumptions on how the initial
states are prepared, based on which they estimate how
much error, to the first order, is expected in each qubit.
They then use their method to approximate the fidelity
of the final state. While a good approach to prove the
scaling improvement offered by their proposed scheme, it
falls short of the accurate scheme that we need for key
rate calculations. A follow-up paper by Bratzik et al.
[30] attempted to fill this gap by approximating the ac-
tual state that one would obtain for the decoded state of
a 3-qubit repetition code by accounting for imperfections
in the CNOT gates as well as the initial Bell states. They
use several approximations to achieve this goal:
• They model the error in a cascade of operations by
separating the ideal and the first-order error term in
the output from the rest, where the rest is modelled
6by a generic identity operator at the output. The first-
order error term is modelled by the identity operator
for the involved qubits in the operation.
• They find a set of operations that will be corrected
by the BSM operation, in addition to what may be
corrected by the employed code. Based on this, they
find a set of correctable states that will be mapped to
the desired encoded Bell states. They use these states
to crudely calculate the probability of obtaining the
desired state after a number of ES operations, and as-
sume that, in all other cases, the identity operator is
obtained.
Based on the above assumptions, they would then con-
clude that the considered encoded QR cannot beat the
original QR protocol in [13] in terms of the achievable
key rate or the required gate error parameters.
In this work, we improve upon the approach taken in
[30] in several respects. First, we improve the accuracy
of the calculations by accounting for errors in each gate
individually rather than modelling the overall effect, for
a cascade of gates, in a crude way. Our new approach
enables us to show that the encoded QRs are resilient
to larger margins of error than previously thought. It
is also easier to apply our method to other codes than
the 3-qubit repetition code considered in [30], as some of
their steps are specific to this employed code. As such,
extending their approach to other code structures is not
necessarily straightforward. Here, we employ an ana-
lytical approach that relies on the linearity of the quan-
tum circuits and the transversality of the employed code,
and, in principle, can be applied to other moderate code
structures. Finally, an important element of our key rate
analysis is to use the information reported by the middle
nodes of the repeater chain at its end nodes. This allows
us to classify the decoded states, based on the measure-
ment results at the ES and decoding stages, resulting in a
considerable improvement of system performance. This
also reduces the complexity of the corresponding key rate
analysis. Overall, this work enables us to obtain a more
accurate picture of the requirements of such systems in
practice, and whether, any simplified version of them,
can realistically be built with current technologies.
In the following sections, we will first use the simplest
repeater setup, where only one swap operation is per-
formed, to describe our methodology, and to justify cer-
tain simplifying assumptions that we make in neglecting
the less dominant terms. Then, we will extend our results
to higher nesting levels and obtain the secret key rate in
our setup as a function of various system parameters.
III. METHODOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE:
NESTING LEVEL ONE
In this section, we look at the simplest repeater setup
with only one middle node corresponding to nesting level
one. The initial objective here is to find a scalable
methodology by which the final entangled state shared
by Alice and Bob can be calculated. We then find the
secret fraction corresponding to different decoded states
conditioned on the measurement results at the ES and
decoding stages. This allows us to better understand
how each term and each imperfection affect system per-
formance. This guides us toward finding simple, but still
tight, approximations that reduce the complexity of the
problem in hand.
A. Linearization
Our first objective is to develop a methodology to cal-
culate the joint state between memory banks A and D,
ρAD, in Fig. 1(b), after one round of entanglement swap-
ping. We first explain this procedure when the initial
codeword states in memory banks A–D are perfectly en-
coded as follows
ρinA =
1
2
(|000〉A + |111〉A)(A〈000|+ A〈111|)
=
1
2
[(|0〉A〈0|)⊗3 + (|0〉A〈1|)⊗3
+ (|1〉A〈0|)⊗3 + (|1〉A〈1|)⊗3],
ρinB = |000〉B〈000| = (|0〉B〈0|)⊗3, (12)
where (|i〉K〈j|)⊗3 ≡ |i〉K1〈j|⊗|i〉K2〈j|⊗|i〉K3〈j|, for i, j =
0, 1. The initial state for C and D, ρinC and ρ
in
D, are,
respectively, similar to that of A and B. In this case, we
can first find the joint state ρAB (ρCD) of memory banks
A and B (C and D) after the remote CNOT operation,
and then apply the ES operation. In this case, we have
ρrAB =
UrABTrab[M
r
RCERC(ρin)]UrAB
Tr[MrRCERC(ρin)]
, (13)
where Trab is the partial trace over memory banks a and
b, ERC is the combination of all remote CNOT gate opera-
tions on Aa and bB memory banks, MrRC is the collective
projective measurement operator at this step correspond-
ing to the pattern of measurement results given by r, and
UrAB is the corresponding Pauli frame correction in Fig. 2.
In Eq. (13), the input state is given by
ρin = ρinA ⊗ ρinB ⊗ ρWab, (14)
where ρWab = ρ
W
a1b1
⊗ ρWa2b2 ⊗ ρWa3b3 as given by Eq. (7) for
the subsystems specified by the subscripts. The quantum
operation ERC is also given by
ERC = E1 ⊗ E2 ⊗ E3, (15)
with, for i = 1, 2, 3,
Ei = EAiai ⊗ EbiBi , (16)
where EKJ is given by the transformation in Eq. (8) for
the gate CNOTK→J .
7As mentioned earlier the direct approach of calculating
ERC(ρin) requires dealing with a space of dimension 212
even for the simple 3-qubit repetition code considered
here. In order to simplify the process and reduce the
time required for running the code, we use the linearity
of operator ERC and its tensor product form in Eq. (15).
To be more precise, using Eq. (12), we have
ERC(ρin) = 1
2
∑
j,k=0,1
3⊗
i=1
Ei(|j〉Ai〈k| ⊗ |0〉Bi〈0| ⊗ ρWaibi).
(17)
By the above trick, we reduce the computational com-
plexity of the problem to effectively that of a 4 qubit
system in each row comprising of qubits Ai, ai, bi, and
Bi, for i = 1, 2, 3. For each component of the input state,
we just need to calculate the output for one row, extend
it to all rows by a simple tensor product, and then sum
over all possible input components.
In order to calculate ρrAB in Eq. (13), we also need
to apply measurement operators. It turns out, however,
that similar to a teleportation scheme, once unitary cor-
rections, which are assumed error free here, are applied,
the output state will not be a function of the measure-
ment outcome. In fact, one can see in Fig. 2 that for
any Bell state at aibi input, the chance of having |0〉 and
|1〉, at each input is identical. This probability does not
change by the unitary operation of CNOT gates, or the
identity operator in case of an error, hence right before Z
and X-basis measurements on aibi, all four possible out-
comes are equally likely. Without loss of generality, we
then drop the superscript r and calculate the output state
for the particular r corresponding to |0+〉aibi , i = 1, 2, 3,
for which no Pauli frame correction is needed. We can
then apply relevant normalisation factors to Eq. (17) to
find the joint state ρAB of memory banks A and B, and
similarly C and D, after remote CNOT operation as fol-
lows:
ρAB =
1
2
∑
j,k=0,1
3⊗
i=1
ρjkAiBi , (18)
where
ρjkAiBi = 4Traibi [P
ai
0 P
bi
+ Ei(|j〉Ai〈k||0〉Bi〈0|ρWaibi)]. (19)
The next step is to model the ES stage, which can
also be thought of certain gate operations, represented
collectively by EES, followed by some single-qubit mea-
surements. In this case, the joint state of memory banks
A and D, upon observing a measurement outcome m on
B and C, is given by
ρmAD =
UmADTrBC [M
m
BCEES(ρinES)]UmAD
pm
, (20)
where pm = Tr[M
m
BCE(ρinES)], MmBC is the collective pro-
jective measurement operator on memory banks B, in X
basis, and C, in Z basis, corresponding to the measure-
ment result m, UmAD is the corresponding Pauli frame
correction, and the input state is given by
ρinES = ρAB ⊗ ρCD, (21)
with
EES =
3⊗
i=1
EBiCi . (22)
Using the linear form of the input states as in Eq. (18),
we then obtain
EES(ρinES) =
1
4
∑
j,k=0,1
∑
n,l=0,1
3⊗
i=1
EBiCi(ρjkAiBi ⊗ ρnlCiDi),
(23)
in which, again, the BSM operation is identical and sep-
arable in all rows, and only needs to be calculated once
per row in our simulation code. Basically, by breaking
the codeword in Eq. (12) into its individual terms, we
have broken the entanglement that exists across different
rows of Fig. 1(b) and can now deal with the state evo-
lution in each row separately. The entanglement will be
put together where in the end we add all corresponding
terms before applying the decoding operation.
This whole process, including the imperfect measure-
ment and decoding ones, has analytically been imple-
mented in Mathematica to provide us with an exact de-
scription of ρmAD, and its corresponding decoded states,
for the first nesting level. The measurement part is
straightforward as it also can be implemented horizon-
tally along each row according to Eq. (9), by which B
registers are measured in X basis and C memories are
measured in Z basis. That is, in Eq. (20), we have
TrBC [M
m
BCEES(ρinES)] =
1
4
∑
j,k=0,1
∑
n,l=0,1
3⊗
i=1
ρjknlAiDi(mi),
(24)
where
ρjknlAiDi(mi) = TrBiCi [M
mi
BiCi
EBiCi(ρjkAiBi ⊗ ρnlCiDi)], (25)
with MmBC =
⊗3
i=1M
mi
BiCi
and mi representing the mea-
surement outcome in row i. The decoding process has
been implemented by modelling the CNOT gates in the
decoding circuit of Fig. 3 according to Eq. (8). By refer-
ring to the whole decoding procedure by operator Edec,
we can obtain the final decoded state as follows
ρdecm,d =
UdA1D1TrA2A3D2D3 [M
d
decEdec(ρmAD)]UdA1D1
pd|m
, (26)
where pd|m = Tr[MddecEdec(ρmAD)], Mddec is the corre-
sponding measurement operator to outcome d at the de-
coder ends, and UdA1D1 is the corresponding correction
operator.
8Computationally speaking, in our method, we are
mostly dealing with only 4-qubit systems. This con-
siderably simplifies analytical calculations. There are,
however, some exceptions to this. For the 3-qubit repeti-
tion code, the last step in Eq. (26) would involve dealing
with a 6-qubit system, which is manageable. As the code
grows in size, full implementation of the decoding circuit,
which requires handling a multipartite entangled state in
its input, would become more challenging. In that case,
our scheme would still be helpful if we ignore the errors
in the decoding circuit. Alternatively, one can think of
simpler decoder structures that only rely on single-qubit
measurements [35]. Imperfect encoding could also cause
additional complexity in our technique. In the next sub-
sections, we assess the importance of both encoding and
decoding modelling in our analysis. But, before that,
let us first explore which measurement outcomes would
impact our secret key generation rate the most.
B. Good, bad, and golden states
The procedure described above can be used to find the
decoded state, ρdecm,d, for any possible outcome m of the
ES stage and d of the decoding stage. There are, however,
64 possible values for m and 16 for d, each of which could
result in a different decoded state, hence different secret
key fraction for all those instances that we have got the
same measurement outcomes.
To calculate the total secret fraction, we need to aver-
age over all possible outcomes as follows
rtotal∞ =
∑
m,d
pm,dr
m,d
∞ , (27)
where
pm,d = pmpd|m (28)
is the probability of getting the measurement outcomesm
and d and rm,d∞ = r∞(ρ
dec
m,d) is the secret fraction obtained
from Eq. (10) and Eq. (11).
Note that in Eq. (27) we make full usage of the avail-
able measurement information, m and d, from earlier
steps. This is expected to give us a higher key rate than
the key rate that can be calculated from the state aver-
aged over different ES and/or decoder outcomes. This is
because of the convexity of the secret fraction formula in
Eq. (10) as a function of ex and ez. Figure 4 confirms this
assertion by comparing the secret fraction for the follow-
ing four cases at δ = 0 and F0 = 0.98 versus β: (i) when
we use the full information in m and d as proposed in
this work (solid line); (ii) when we assume the users have
no knowledge of m, but know d, which can be locally
obtained by each user (dash-dotted line). In this case,
we first find the average ES state over all possible values
of m, and then pass it to our decoder circuits; (iii) when
the users have the information from the ES stage, but
the decoder output d will only be used internally in the
FIG. 4: Secret fraction at F0 = 0.98 and δ = 0 for (i) when
we fully use the knowledge of m and d, as given by Eq. (27)
(solid blue curve), versus (ii) when only d is known to the
users, but not m (dash-dotted green curve), or (iii) when only
m is known to the users, but not d (dashed amber curve), or
(iv) when none of m and d is used for key extraction (dotted
red curve).
decoder to correct the shared state (dashed line). In this
case, the total secret fraction is given by
∑
m pmr∞(ρm),
where ρm ≡
∑
d pd|mρ
dec
m,d; and (iv) when the users do not
know of either m or d before doing QKD measurements
(dotted line), i.e., when the decoded state is given by
ρavg =
∑
m,d pm,dρ
dec
m,d. In this case, the whole repeater
chain and decoders are seen as a black-box channel by the
users. As can be seen, by accounting for all different out-
comes separately, we can tolerate, respectively, roughly
three and two times larger values of β, as compared to the
cases where we use ρavg or ρm for secret key extraction.
Even if we only use the information at the decoder units,
which is at the same place as the users’ locations, we can
obtain higher key rates than cases (iii) and (iv). This
shows the importance of the internal information across
the repeater chain and the user boxes in our QKD sys-
tem. Note that a similar observation has been made for
third generation quantum repeaters, and how accounting
for syndrome information can boost system performance
[36].
The key rate calculation in Eq. (27) can be cumber-
some as many terms need to be considered. There are
several ways by which we can group different terms in
Eq. (27) together to reduce the required computation.
First, note that, for QKD applications, the secret key
analysis is independent of which Bell state is the tar-
get state as they are all the same up to local Pauli
rotations. Furthermore, the Pauli frame adjustments
needed after the BSMs consists of a series of single-
qubit operations, which, in our analysis, are assumed
perfect. Thus, in this work, we calculate the secret frac-
tion for only |Φ˜〉A,D as the ES measurement outcome,
and use the same result for other encoded Bell states in
Eq. (5). This reduces the number of relevant ES out-
comes to 16 corresponding to the measurement results
{| + ++〉B , | + −−〉B , | − +−〉B , | − −+〉B}, at memory
bank B, and {|000〉C , |001〉C , |010〉C , |100〉C}, at mem-
ory bank C. Further investigation shows that the four
9different outcomes at memory bank B do not affect the
generated secret fraction as long as the measurement re-
sults at memory bank C are the same. We can then
only limit ourselves to the specific measurement result
|+ ++〉B , which further reduces the number of relevant
ES outcomes to 4.
Based on the above discussion, we recognise two
generic groups of output states, after the ES stage, which
we refer to as good versus bad states. For |Φ˜〉A,D as the
ES measurement outcome, the good ES states correspond
to the measurement outcome |000〉C where no bit flip has
been detected at the ES stage, whereas the bad ES states
correspond to the measurement outcomes |001〉C , |010〉C ,
or |100〉C in which we have detected a bit-flip error at the
ES stage.
For both good and bad states, we still have 16 cases
to consider for the decoder output. We refer to a de-
coded good state as a golden state if the two users detect
no error at their decoder circuits. This corresponds to
the measurement outcome dg = |00〉A2A3 |00〉D2D3 . The
probability of getting a golden state, and its correspond-
ing total secret fraction is then given by
pg = 16pmg,dg and r
g
∞ = pgr
mg,dg∞ , (29)
where mg = |+ ++〉B |000〉C , and the factor 16 accounts
for the four possible Bell states at the ES stage, and the
four outcomes of the B register. Similarly, we have a
group of good, but not golden, states, whose correspond-
ing total probability of occurrence and secret fraction are
given by
pgng = 16
∑
d 6=dg
pmg,d and r
gng
∞ = 16
∑
d6=dg
pmg,dr
mg,d∞ .
(30)
Finally the corresponding probability and secret fraction
to bad states are given by
pb = 48
∑
d
pmb,d and r
b
∞ = 48
∑
d
pmb,dr
mb,d∞ , (31)
where mb = | + ++〉B |100〉C , and the factor 48 covers
three different locations of a single error in register C,
each at 16 different cases of Bell state and B register
outcomes as in golden states. The total secret fraction is
then given by
rtotal∞ = r
g
∞ + r
gng
∞ + r
b
∞. (32)
One of the key results of this work is to show that,
in most practical cases, the golden states are the main
positive contributor to the key rate formula in Eq. (32),
that is, rtotal∞ ' rg∞. This result allows us to considerably
reduce the complexity of the problem in that, instead
of accounting for all possible outcomes at different parts
of the repeater chain, we only focus on a single class of
states.
Here, we demonstrate how different kinds of states con-
tribute to the key rate. Figure 5 shows the total secret
fraction and its three main components in Eq. (32) for dif-
ferent parameter regimes, for the initial codeword states
as in Eq. (12). We make several interesting observations
from this figure, as summarized below:
• Observation 1: At δ = 0, only golden states can
generate positive key rates. This has been shown in
Figs. 5(a)-(b). In Fig. 5(a), we have assumed that
the initial Bell states are ideal and that there is no
measurement error. We have then plotted the secret
fraction versus the CNOT gate error parameter, β. It
can be seen that, in this case, the golden state is the
only contributor to the total secret fraction. It turns
out that for all other states the phase error rate is at
its worst possible value of 0.5 at which no secret key
can be generated. We have a similar observation in
Fig. 5(b), where, now, β = 0, and F0 is a variable.
In this case, our analysis indicates that most decoder
outcomes simply never happen. But, even if they do,
except for golden states, for all other terms ex = 0.5.
To see why this happens we can look back at the ideal
state obtained after the ES operation in Eq. (5). In
order to detect an error state such as |+ ++〉B |100〉C
at the ES stage, we can either have an error corre-
sponding to XC1 , which results in |φ+〉 after decoding,
or something like ZB1XC1 , which results in |φ−〉. If
we trace back these errors, using known circuits that
convert an error after a CNOT gate to errors before it
[30], we can see that such errors, respectively, originate
from |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉 somewhere earlier in the circuit.
In the case of imperfect Bell states, this is caused by
the terms in the input Werner state in Eq. (7). The
identity operator in the imperfect CNOT gate can sim-
ilarly introduce such states in the circuit resulting in
a similar behavior. In both cases, the weight of |ψ+〉
and |ψ−〉 is the same at the input mixture, resulting in
an equal mixture of |φ+〉 and |φ−〉 after decoding. At
δ = 0, according to Eq. (11), this results in ex = 0.5.
• Observation 2: At δ 6= 0, non-golden states can con-
tribute to the total secret fraction but at comparatively
much lower values. This can be seen from Figs. 5(c)-
(d). In Fig. 5(c), we have fixed β and F0 to their ideal
values and have plotted the secret fraction for different
values of δ. This is the first case in which rgng∞ and r
b
∞
take nonzero values for some values of δ. The reason
for this is that if we detect an error at the ES stage, for
instance, by observing |100〉C , because of measurement
errors, the actual state in hand, according to Eq. (5), is
most likely still the ideal state. Most cases for the de-
coder output are also similarly benign. The errors that
may happen at the remote CNOT stage could equally
result in bit or phase-flip errors, both with a proba-
bility scaling with δ. This allows us to have positive
key rates for bad, as well as, good, but not golden,
states. At low values of δ, however, the overall chance
of obtaining such states is much lower than that of the
golden states, which makes the total secret fraction still
approximately the same as rg∞. Finally, in Fig. 5(d),
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we have verified this finding when β and δ are nonzero.
We have chosen δ = 0.01 as it gives a high rate for
bad states in Fig. 5(c). We observe that the key rate
for bad and good-but-not-golden states is nonzero for
small value of β. This suggests that so long as the phase
error rate is dominated by the measurement error we
can get a positive key rate for non-golden states. But,
once β increases to the level that the dominant source
of phase error is what we discussed in Observation 1,
then no secret keys can be extracted from such terms.
At δ = 0.01 the onset of dominance of CNOT errors is
just before β = 0.01. At δ = 0.001, we have verified
that the golden state is the only contributor to the key
rate for β > 0.0046. Given that in practice it is easier
to have a low value for δ as compared to β, this obser-
vation suggests that for sufficiently small δ, the errors
in the two-qubit gates would be the dominant factor in
determining the final key rate. The latter can reliably
be calculated from golden states in such cases.
• Observation 3: At cut-off point, the golden states
are the main contributor to the key rate. Even though
the non-golden states can contribute to a small ex-
tent to the key rate within some range of parameters,
their contribution effectively ceases to zero by the time
that we get to the cut-off point for our QKD system.
This suggests that to find such maximum allowed error
rates, one can reliably only calculate the key rate for
the golden states.
• Observation 4: The measurement error δ has the
lowest cut-off point ahead of β and 1− F0. According
to Fig. 5(c), at δ ≈ 0.023, the key rate drops to zero.
This happens at β ≈ 0.07, in Fig. 5(a), and F0 ≈
0.76 in Fig. 5(b). This could simply be because of the
number of measurement operations in the whole setup
exceeding the number of CNOT gates. But, this also
suggests that unless δ is sufficiently small, its effect
cannot necessarily be neglected in a reliable analysis of
the system.
Based on the above observations, in the remaining of
this paper, we only calculate rg∞. This is a tight lower
bound on rtotal∞ , in line with the common practice in cal-
culating the key rate in QKD. More importantly, this
suggests a practical distillation technique in such encoded
repeaters, in which one can simply ignore the output if
any error has been detected at the ES or decoding stage.
This could substantially simplify the implementation of
such systems in their early demonstrations. Under the
assumption that rg∞ closely follows r
total
∞ , this distilla-
tion technique is more effective than relying on the error
correction capabilities of the code. That is, in practical
QKD settings, we may only need to use the error detec-
tion features of a code rather than its error correction
power.
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FIG. 5: Secret fraction as a function of different error param-
eters at (a) F0 = 1 and δ = 0; (b) β = 0 and δ = 0; (c) F0 = 1
and β = 0; and (d) F0 = 1 and δ = 0.01. In all graphs, the
top blue curve is for the total secret fraction, rtotal∞ , followed
by the golden curve, rg∞, for golden states, the green curve
rgng∞ for good, but not golden, states, and the red curve, r
b
∞,
for bad states. In (a) and (b), the latter two terms are zero,
so the golden curve overlaps with the blue one.
C. The effect of the encoding and decoding circuits
on the secret fraction
In this section, we study how errors in encoding and
decoding circuits would affect the achievable secret frac-
tion. Thus far, we have only considered the perfectly
encoded states as given by Eq. (12), which can be a rea-
sonable assumption if one uses probabilistic techniques
to initialize the memories. If, however, one uses CNOT
gates to create such states deterministically, we should
also account for errors in such gates. In this case, the
initial codeword states for memory bank A, as an exam-
ple, is given by [30]
ρinA = ρ
code
A + ρ
other
A , (33)
where
ρcodeA =
1
2
[1 + β(β/2− 5/4)](|000〉A〈000|+ |111〉A〈111|)
+
1
2
(1− β)2(|000〉A〈111|+ |111〉A〈000|) (34)
and
ρotherA =
β
4
(3/2− β)(|101〉A〈101|+ |010〉A〈010|)
+
β
8
(|001〉A〈001|+ |100〉A〈100|)
+
β
8
(|110〉A〈110|+ |011〉A〈011|). (35)
The terms in Eq. (34) are effectively the encoded state in
Eq. (12) although with modified weights to account for
CNOT errors. Our linearization technique is easily appli-
cable to these terms as they are still in the desired tensor
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FIG. 6: Secret fraction versus β at F0 = 0.98 and δ = 0. The
solid lines correspond to error-free decoding circuits, and the
dashed lines correspond to imperfect decoding circuits. The
top blue curve in each batch corresponds to ideal encoding;
the lower orange lines correspond to imperfect encoders as
modelled by Eq. (33), and the middle green lines correspond
to the coded part of the encoded state given by Eq. (34). In
all cases the secret fraction is lower bounded by that of the
golden states. The black dotted curve is the corresponding
graph obtained in [30] for the same parameter values for their
model of imperfect encoders and decoders.
product form of having the same input qubit in all rows.
To apply our technique to the other terms in Eq. (35),
we need to consider many more combinations of input
states, which will increase the complexity of the simu-
lation especially at higher nesting levels. Here, through
the comparison of the secret fraction for different input
states, we show that the coded part in Eq. (34) plays the
major role in determining the secret fraction, based on
which we can neglect the other terms. This will crucially
simplify the code for further simulation. Note that the
above states have been obtained by first applying EA1A2
and then EA1A3 , as the two operators do not commute
for nonzero values of β.
Figure 6 shows the secret fraction versus β at F0 = 0.98
and δ = 0 in several different cases. The top three
curves (solid lines) give the secret fraction if we neglect
all sources of error at the decoder stage, whereas the next
batch of three curves (dashed lines) account for errors in
the decoder circuit. In each batch, we consider three
cases: (i) the encoding circuits are all perfect (top blue
curves), that is, we assume β = 0 in these modules; (ii)
The encoding process is modelled by the imperfect en-
coded state given in Eq. (33) (the bottom orange curves);
and (iii) The encoding process is modelled by the state
ρcodeA in Eq. (34) (green curves in the middle of the cir-
cled batches). Two important observations can be made
from this graph. First, it is clear that the imperfections
in the decoder module is far more important than the
encoder one. For a realistic analysis of the system, it
will then be crucial to account for decoder errors, as we
do in this paper. The second point is that, especially
in the case of imperfect decoders, which is of practical
interest, the effect of ρotherA on the secret fraction is effec-
tively negligible, as the curve obtained from ρcodeA very
closely follows that of the imperfect encoder modelled
by the full state in Eq. (33). In the rest of this work,
we will then only account for ρcodeA when we model im-
perfections in the encoders. As mentioned earlier, this
will substantially simplify our analysis as we only need
to replace ρjkAiBi in Eq. (19) with (Cjk)
1/3ρjkAiBi , where
C00 = C11 = 1 +β(β/2−5/4) and C01 = C10 = (1−β)2.
In Fig. 6, we have also compared our results with Fig. 6
in [30], which, for the same parameters, obtains the se-
cret fraction for the same system but without using the
post-selection that we make on the basis of good/bad
states, or decoder outputs. The corresponding curve in
[30] is shown by the dotted black line. The results clearly
demonstrate how substantially one can improve the per-
formance of QKD over encoded repeater setups by rely-
ing mainly on the error detection, rather than correction,
features of the code. This could also change the main con-
clusion drawn in [30] in that such repeaters can hardly
outperform other classes of deterministic repeaters as the
cut-off point for β has nearly improved by six folds from
nearly 0.01 to about 0.06 when imperfections in both en-
coders and decoders are considered. Another distinction,
between our work and that of [30] is in the way errors
have been modelled in each case. In [30], errors are mod-
elled collectively by an identity operator even if there is
a cascade of operations. This is expected to overestimate
the error in the system. In our work, we account for er-
rors per individual gates, which gives us a more accurate
picture of how errors propagate to the final state, and
eventually affect the secret fraction. Based on the find-
ings in Fig. 4 and Fig. 6, there is a two-fold improvement
in the cut-off value of β because of such more accurate
modelling and calculations.
In the following section, we use the results of this sec-
tion to analyse the repeater chain at higher nesting levels.
Based on the performance analysis for nesting level one,
we will only consider the golden state contribution to the
secret fraction. Unless otherwise mentioned, we fully ac-
count for imperfections in the decoder, but only use the
coded components in Eq. (34) to model the encoder.
IV. EXTENSION TO HIGHER-NESTING
LEVELS
The methodology developed in Section III A can be
extended to higher nesting levels in a recursive way. For
instance, at nesting level n = 2, we can think of 8 memory
banks named A to H, where we first apply our ES tech-
nique to BC and FG pairs and then DE. In this case,
the output state of the ES stage, for measurement output
mg = | + 0〉 at all corresponding ES measurements, can
be written as follows:
ρ
mg
AH = ρ
(2)
ES/Tr[ρ
(2)
ES ], (36)
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FIG. 7: The secret fraction as a function of (a) gate error
probability β, (b) measurement error probability δ, and (c)
the error in the initial Bell states 1− F0, at different nesting
levels. In each case, the other two parameters have taken
their ideal values.
where
ρ
(2)
ES =
1
16
∑
j1,...,j8=0,1
3⊗
i=1
ρj1,...,j8AiHi (mg), (37)
with
ρj1,...,j8AiHi (mg) = TrDiEi [M
mg
DiEi
EDiEi(ρj1,...,j4AiDi (mg)⊗ ρ
j5,...,j8
EiHi
(mg))]. (38)
Here, ρj1,...,j4AiDi (mg) and ρ
j5,...,j8
EiHi
(mg) have already been
calculated in Eq. (25). One can generalize this technique
to higher nesting levels in a similar way to obtain the
corresponding matrix ρ
(n)
ES for nesting level n. The corre-
sponding golden state for the two end nodes A and A′ is
then given by
ρ
(n)
AA′ = ρ
(n)
dec/Tr[ρ
(n)
dec], (39)
where
ρ
(n)
dec =
TrA2A3A′2A′3 [P
A2
0 P
A3
0 P
A′2
0 P
A′3
0 Edec(ρ(n)ES )]
Tr[ρ
(n)
ES ]
. (40)
The corresponding secret fraction can then be lower
bounded by
r(n)∞ = 16
2n−1Tr[ρ(n)ES ]Tr[ρ
(n)
dec]r∞(ρ
(n)
AA′), (41)
where the prefactors are, respectively, the number of
golden states at nesting level n and the corresponding
probability for each.
As an application of the analytical method we devel-
oped above, we look into the dependence of the secret
fraction on various sources of errors in the setup. Figure
7 shows the secret fraction, for the first three nesting
levels, as a function of β, δ, and 1 − F0, while, in each
case, the other two parameters are assumed ideal. As ex-
pected, the secret fraction drops as we go to higher nest-
ing levels as the number of gates and measurement op-
erations exponentially grows with the nesting level. The
resilience to error parameters would correspondingly go
down, but, instead, we are covering exponentially longer
distances, at higher nesting levels, if we assume the ele-
mentary link is of the same length in all cases. Given that
by increasing the nesting level by one, we have over twice
as many operations as before, a simple rule of thumb may
suggest that the cut-off point for each source of error
must be halved. Our exact calculations suggest that the
new cut-off points are slightly better than what is pre-
dicted by this rule of thumb, which could be because some
errors cancel each other when one considers all possibili-
ties, as we do in our analysis. For instance, at n = 1, 2, 3,
the maximum allowed β is, respectively, 0.062, 0.041, and
0.026. As it was the case for n = 1, the secret fraction is
most sensitive to δ and least sensitive to F0. It is there-
fore crucial to have accurate single-qubit measurement
operations in such QRs to make them useful for QKD
purposes.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we studied the performance of QKD sys-
tems run over a repeater setup that used three-qubit rep-
etition codes for entanglement distillation. By modeling
the error in all two-qubit gates and single-qubit mea-
surements, we obtained an accurate picture of the re-
quirements of such systems. It turned out that such
systems could considerably be more resilient to errors
than previously thought. The system was most sensi-
tive to measurement errors, but, provided that they were
kept sufficiently low in the experimental setup, we showed
that CNOT errors on the order of a few percents could
be tolerated. The QKD system could also handle im-
perfections in the initial Bell states aligned with what
experimentally is achievable today [37, 38]. To handle
the computational complexity associated with this many-
qubit repeater setup, we devised an analytical technique
for modelling the repeater chain, where, at the core of
it, we only needed to deal with four qubits at a time.
This enabled us to obtain the analytical form of the fi-
nal entangled states shared between the two end users
after several nesting levels. Moreover, our analysis en-
abled us to fully account for the information available to
the end users, from entanglement swapping and decoding
circuits, in their secret key distillation. By using this in-
formation, we showed three-fold increase in resilience to
errors in CNOT gates as compared to when the repeater
chain and decoders are treated as a black box. By look-
ing at different sets of measurement outcomes, we then
identified the key golden states that contributed the most
to the final key rate. These golden states corresponded
to the cases where no error had been detected at entan-
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glement swapping and decoding stages. This observation
resulted in a simple, but effective, post-selection tool for
our QKD system that entirely relied on the error detec-
tion features of the code, rather than its error correction
as when we treat the repeater chain as a black box. We
also studied the impact of errors in the encoder and de-
coder circuits and showed that the latter is much more
detrimental to the QKD system.
The analytical framework derived in this paper can be
improved and extended to consider more complex code
structures and alternative decoders. One of the com-
putational challenges that we have to deal with is the
number of terms that needs to be calculated in the final
state. In its exact form, we need to consider all com-
binations of input states to the elementary links, whose
number grows exponentially with the nesting level. To
manage the complexity, we need then to identify which
input combinations have a major impact on the final key
rate, and which ones could perhaps be neglected for a
tight approximation. The decoder setup could also pose
computational challenges as in its current form, it takes a
multi-qubit entangled state at its input and gives a bipar-
tite state at its output. For large codes, it may be hard
to computationally handle the large input. Alternative
decoders may need to be designed to offer competitive
performance especially if larger codes suffer more from
errors in the system. Finally, this work mainly relied on
finding the key rate once the repeater chain had gener-
ated an entangled state. In order to calculate the total
key rate one should look at the timing of the protocol
with respect to the initial entanglement distribution and
how multiplexing is used in the system. All the above will
be addressed in a forthcoming paper under preparation
[35].
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